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BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANT
WAS SEIZED WHEN OFFICER KNIGHTON AND HER PARTNER, IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY, APPROACHED DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE - WITH LIGHTS OUT - AND THEN, WHEN "NOSE TO
NOSE" WITH DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, SUDDENLY ACTIVATED THE
"TAKEDOWN LIGHTS" AND THE HIGH-BEAM HEADLIGHTS OF THE
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The State, in its Brief, argues that "Deputy Knighton's action
constituted a permissible Hevel one' police-citizen encounter, as
discussed by the Supreme Court in Terry
(1968) ." Brief of Appellee, p. 9.

v. Ohio,

88 S.Ct. 1868

In the course of so arguing, the

State claims that "Defendant's analysis is marred by omission of a

3

critical fact related to the distance between the parked vehicles,1
and by the nature of the lights2 used by the deputy." Id.

at 10.

The State's analysis, however, is marred by its failure to
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Officers'
conduct in the course of confronting Defendant's vehicle.
v.

Smith,

See

State

781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1989) (''Characterization of the

encounter . . . must be determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances").

According to the State, there was no seizure

lf

The State's fixation upon the statement by Officer Knighton that
the patrol vehicle, in the "nose to nose" position with Defendant's
vehicle, was "maybe a car length or so away" from Defendant's vehicle
is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances
review of the encounter. See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S.
544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876 (1980). While the distance between
the noses of the cars in and of itself may not indicate a seizure,
the totality of the circumstances of the confrontational posture
utilized by Officer Knighton and her partner together with the manner
in which the "take down" lights and high-beam headlights were
activated upon Defendant's vehicle, among other factors, constitutes
a seizure.
2

The State, in its Brief, attempts to mitigate the show of
authority utilized by Officer Knighton and her partner when the
Officers activated both the high-beam headlights and "takedown
lights" of the patrol vehicle onto Defendant's vehicle in a "nose to
nose" position with Defendant's vehicle, which had been backed up
against the barricades or signs surrounding the construction area.
In short, the State argues that the illumination of an area by
officers is not a show of authority sufficient to constitute a
seizure. Again, the State fails to consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter between Defendant and the
Officers. Defendant agrees that the illumination, by itself, may not
be enough to constitute a seizure. However, when the totality of the
circumstances of the encounter set forth below are considered with
the activation of the high-beam headlights and "takedown lights," as
they should be, there was a seizure.
Interestingly, Officer
Knighton, in the course of her testimony at the suppression hearing,
referred to the lights on the patrol vehicle utilized in the course
of the encounter with Defendant as "takedown lights" (R. 49, lines
13-17/ and R. 53, lines 8-10).
4

because the marked patrol vehicle was "maybe a car length or so away"
when the Officers' parked the patrol vehicle "nose to nose" with
Defendant's vehicle and therefore it was possible for Defendant "to
drive around the patrol car."3
A seizure occurs when an officer "by means of physical force or
show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a
person."
United

State

States

v. Trujillo,

739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987) (citing

v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876

(1980) (citing Terry
1879, n.16 (1968)).

v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868,

"When a reasonable person, based on the totality

of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with
the officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free
to leave a seizure occurs." Id.

(citing Mendenhall,

446 U.S. at 555,

100 S.Ct. at 1877).
The totality of the circumstances of the encounter between
Officer Knighton, her partner, and Defendant are as follows:
1.

2.

On March 3, 1995, at approximately 9:58 p.m., Officer
Knighton, a Deputy Paramedic with the Davis County
Sheriff's Office (R. 47), and her partner were patrolling
westbound on Center Street in North Salt Lake (R. 8-11);
In the course of patrolling, Officer Knighton observed
Defendant's truck traveling westbound on Center Street
"half a mile or so" ahead of the patrol vehicle (R. 48,
lines 13-14);

3

The State's argument presupposes that there must be a complete
blockage of Defendant's vehicle to constitute a seizure. However, in
People v. Guy, 329 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. App. 1982), which was cited by
this Court as supporting authority in State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879,
882 n.3 (Utah App. 1989), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a
partial blockage of the driveway and subsequent visit to the
defendant's vehicle constituted a seizure. Id. at 440.

5

The area being patrolled was an open field area with some
construction taking place on a bridge where Center Street
and the Jordan River intersect (R. 47-48);
As Defendant's truck approached the construction area,
Officer Knighton "became curious to know where they were
going down there" (R. 48, lines 13-17);
Officer Knighton observed Defendant's truck turn and back
up towards the barricades or signs surrounding the
construction area so that the truck faced east (R. 48,
lines 17-19, R. 51, lines 21-22), after which Defendant
stopped the truck and turned off the headlights (R. 48,
lines 17-18).
The construction vehicles and supplies
located in the construction area were located approximately
two hundred feet away from the area where Defendant stopped
his truck (R. 51, lines 1-13);
At no time did Defendant or any of his co-passengers ever
exit Defendant's truck and go towards the construction area
(R. 52, lines 14-19);
The Officers proceeded to Defendant's location "to
determine why the individual had stopped there" (R. 48,
lines 22-23). As they proceeded, Officer Knighton had a
"suspicion" of criminal activity (R. 51-52, Transcript of
Suppression Hearing), which, according to her testimony,
was based on the construction equipment located in the
general vicinity, the lateness of the hour, i.e., 9:58
p.iru, and that criminal activity often occurs in that area
(R. 54);
In the course of proceeding to Defendant's location,
Officer Knighton turned off all of the lights on the patrol
vehicle (R. 48-49). Officer Knighton and her partner then
approached Defendant's truck until the patrol vehicle was
"nose to nose" with Defendant's truck, "maybe a car length
or so away," at which time she then activated the high-beam
headlights and what she referred in her testimony at the
suppression hearing as the "takedown lights" located on the
light bar on top of the patrol vehicle (R. 49, lines 5-17);
Upon activating her high-beam headlights and "takedown
lights," upon Defendant's truck, Officer Knighton observed
three individuals in the truck - two males and a female who looked up towards the patrol vehicle (R. 49-50), at
which time Officer Knighton stated that she "felt some
movement, some secretive movement" (R. 49-50). The patrol
vehicle was a marked patrol vehicle with law enforcement
decals located, among other places, on the doors and the
light bar on the top of the patrol vehicle (R. 53, lines 37). In addition to the "takedown lights," the light bar on
the top of the patrol vehicle had the traditional red and
blue lights in addition to grill lights in the front grill

6

of the patrol vehicle (R. 53-54).
Officer Knighton
approached
Defendant's
vehicle
to
complete
the
investigation.
Under the totality of the circumstances, as set forth above, the
show of authority and conduct by Officer Knighton and her partner
provided Defendant with no reasonable alternative but to submit to
the encounter with the officers. Cf. United States
1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987).

v. Kerr,

817 F.2d

The State's suggestion that Defendant

could have ignored the police action and driven around the patrol car
defies common sense.
was

restrained

The freedom to depart, as the State suggests,

at the moment Deputy Knighton

and her partner

confronted Defendant's vehicle nose-to-nose, at least partially
blocking Defendant's vehicle, activating both the "take-down" lights
and high-beam headlights on the marked patrol vehicle. Moreover, the
confrontation with a clearly marked patrol vehicle and uniformed
Officers created the unquestionable appearance of action in an
official police capacity.
2.

BECAUSE DEPUTY KNIGHTON DID NOT POINT TO OR ARTICULATE
SPECIFIC FACTS, WHICH, TOGETHER WITH RATIONAL
INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THOSE FACTS, WOULD LEAD A
REASONABLE PERSON TO CONCLUDE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED
A CRIME OR WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME, OFFICER
KNIGHTON DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION.

The State argues that Defendant's parking near a construction
area at 9:58 p.m. combined with the Officer's knowledge of frequent
illegal activity in the area justifies reasonable suspicion for the
seizure.

Brief of Appellee, p. 15-18.

To establish the requisite

reasonable suspicion to support a seizure, the officer must "point to

7

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion,"
Terry

v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968).

Such a

determination is made in light of "common sense and ordinary human
experience," United

States

v. Melendez-Garcia,

(10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States

28 F.3d 1046, 1052

v. King,

990 F.2d 1553, 1562

(10th Cir. 1993)), and is made upon considering the "totality of the
circumstances."

United

States

v. Fernandez,

18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th

Cir. 1994).
On page 16 of its Brief, the State, as part of its argument
concerning

reasonable

suspicion,

observed Defendant's vehicle "entering
. . . ." (Emphasis Added).
a

closer

states

that

Officer

Knighton

an isolated construction site

This statement of fact is inaccurate upon

review of the record.

Officer Knighton, on direct

examination, testified to the following:
I observed a vehicle going westbound on Center
Street half a mile or so ahead of me and they
were getting very near the construction
zone and
I became curious to know where they were going
down there. I saw them go and turn and park and
turn off their lights — or stop and turn off
their lights and I became concerned as to why
they were in that area, knowing there's a lot of
construction equipment, building materials and
supplies and so forth there. And so I proceeded
to that location to determine why the individual
had stopped there. And in the process I turned
all the lights off of my vehicle.
(R. 48, lines 13-25) (Emphasis Added).

Contrary to the State's

representation, the record indicates that Defendant did not enter the
construction area, but instead parked outside of such, which was

8

surrounded by moveable barricades and signs

(R. 51).

Further,

although the construction area contained equipment and supplies, the
uncontroverted testimony of Officer Knighton at the suppression
hearing

established

that

the

equipment

and

supplies

were

approximately "a couple of hundred feet" from where Defendant stopped
his vehicle (R. 51, lines 1-13), and that Defendant at no time during
the events in question exited his vehicle (R. 52, lines 14-19).4
A

review of the totality of the circumstances

and

facts

surrounding the seizure by Officer Knighton and her partner, which
were articulated at the suppression hearing, establishes that the
seizure and investigation of Defendant's vehicle was based on Officer
Knighton's curiosity "to know where they were going down there."
Norwithstanding, a Fourth Amendment stop based on an "inchoate and
unparticularized

suspicion or

constitutional scrutiny.
1880, 1883.

*hunch'" alone will not withstand

Terry,

392 U.S. at 22, 27, 88 S.Ct. at

Common sense and ordinary human experience and the

totality of the circumstances warrant that Officer Knighton did not
have reasonable suspicion for the seizure in the instant case
inasmuch as Officer Knighton did not, at any time prior to the
seizure, observe Defendant or his co-passengers engage in any type of

4

The State did not respond to Defendant's arguments and
comparison of facts of the instant case to State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d
674 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), or State v. Swanigan,
699 P.2d 718
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). By way of reply to the State's argument
concerning reasonable suspicion, Defendant reasserts the arguments
concerning the facts of these cases and how such establish the lack
of reasonable suspicion in the instant case. See Brief of Appellant,
pp. 19-20.
9

criminal conduct.
(1979)/ State

See Brown v.

v. Carpena,

and State v. Swanigan,

Texas,

443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637

714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam);

699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) .
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to
Suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this Court's opinion so that Defendant's constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures might be effectuated.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which are matters of
continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the
area

of

search

and

seizure.

The instant

case raises

issues

concerning the facts necessary to constitute a level two seizure and
reasonable suspicion, the development of which would be for the
benefit of the bar and public.

Counsel for Defendant further

requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by

10

opinion designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for
purposes of precedential value and development in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of March, 1997.
,D & WIGGINS, L.C.

Wiggins
Attorneys for Defendant

11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to
be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 24th
day of March, 1997.
BARNARD N. MADSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
S a l t L a k e j t i t ^ K UT 84114-0854

gb&ti-, J/Wigg

12

